We consider a multi-agent system where, at every time instant, many users choose to use one of multiple resources, whose performance depends on the number of concurrent users. In addition, a central agent has up-to-date knowledge of the congestion across all resources. What signals should the central agent broadcast to the individual users in order to reduce the total congestion? We model users with varying levels of aversion to risk, and a heterogeneous population of users over these levels. We consider signaling schemes that communicate for each resource an interval of possible congestion values, instead of scalar values. We show how to optimise over these intervals with respect to the social cost, under constraints that these intervals be consistent with past observations. Moreover, under mild assumptions, the resulting distribution of users across resources converges. 1 Congestion problems are common in control, operations research, theoretical computer science, and traffic theory. A number of surveys are available Sheffi (1985); Ibaraki and Katoh (1988); Stefanov (2001); Patriksson (2008). Much of the existing works focus on deterministic non-linear models of resource allocation and routing. For example, Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses (2005); Müller, Radke, and Vygen (2011) present approximability and and Skutella (2002); Bley (2005) inapproximability results. The social cost is the metric of numerous works Roughgarden and Tardos (2002); Perakis (2004); Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses (2005); Bhaskar, Fleischer, and Huang (2010) . These works show that, even when agents have full information, a natural equilibrium outcome can incur much higher total congestion than a socially optimal outcome. An important distinction of our work is that, instead of a static game theoretic model, we consider a dynamic model evolving over time. The agent do not observe other agents' actions, nor do they act strategically: the only information they have about the congestion of the resources is obtained from signals broadcast by a central agent. The population of agents is heterogeneous in their policies and changes over time.
Introduction
Congestion arises when many agents or users compete for limited resources, negatively affecting each other's enjoyment. This occurs in many situations beyond the roads at rush hour; for instance, queuing at check-in at the airport or check-out at the supermarket, leaving a cinema after a movie or a stadium after a game, escaping out of a city after an emergency, using electricity power or internet bandwidth at peak times, etc. Congestion is not necessarily due to the inherent capacity limits of resources, but sometimes due to agents choosing resources in a "synchronized" manner due to their lack of foresight into other agents' choices.
In this paper, we consider methods to "de-synchronize" agents' actions by providing them with signals. In particular, we study schemes that broadcast one interval for each resource, e.g., road segment, with the additional constraint that each interval remains consistent with past observations. Our main insight is that if the population comprises of risk-averse agents and evolves stochastically over time, then we can improve the social outcome with optimal signaling. In particular, we show how to optimise such signals with respect to the social cost over polyhedral and spectrahedral sets, which capture the notion of consistency with respect to past observations. Furthermore, we show that, under mild assumption, the distribution of users across resources is asymptotically stable.
Our model includes novel interval signaling schemes, a heterogeneous population of agents using multiple distinct policies, and uncertainty in the distribution of such policies in the population. Following a formalization of the model, we motivate our study by showing that broadcasting traffic data as scalar values, or singular probability distributions, can lead to an arbitrarily bad behaviour of the dynamical system. We then present two of our main contributions. First, we show that interval signaling can lead to asymptotically stable outcomes under certain assumptions on the distribution of agents over policies. Then, we present optimisation of the interval signals to broadcast with respect to the social cost as a (distributionally robust) non-convex optimisation problem. We conclude with suggestions for further research.
Model
We describe a dynamic discrete-time model of congestion, where a finite population of N agents is confronted with M alternative choices at every time step. The alternative actions are denoted by {A 1 , . . . , A M } and time is discretized into periods t = 1, 2, . . .. Let a i t denote the choice of agent i at time t and n m t = i 1 [a i t =Am] be the number of agents choosing action A m at time t. Throughout the paper, we assume that each agent has to pick one of the M actions at every time t.
The alternative actions {A 1 , . . . , A M } are perfectly substitutable, i.e., each agent decides only based on the cost. The cost of action A m at time t is a function of the number n m t of agents that pick A m at time t. We let n t denote the vector (n 1 t , . . . , n M t ). Let c m : N → R + denote the so-called cost function for action A m . If n m t agents choose Figure 1 : The setting of the running example. Cost functions: c 1 1.2 + x/N (dashed line) and c 2 1 + (1.08 − x/N ) −1 /22 (solid line). Notice that despite the fact the curves do not intersect, the optimum of the social cost is achieved when both actions are used. Social cost as a function of the initial fraction of agents choosing action A 1 , with the optimum of the social cost at approx. 0.2 highlighted by the dashed vertical line. Notice that the minimum is away from 0.5, which renders policies picking the action uniformly at random suboptimal.
action A m at time t, the cost of action A m at time t to any single of them is c m (n m t ). We assume that all {c m } are continuous. Figure 1 gives an example of two cost functions.
The social cost C(n t ) weights the costs of the two actions at time t with the proportions of agents taking the two actions, i.e.,
The social cost corresponding to the example cost functions is shown in Figure 1 . Of further interest is the time-averaged social cost:
We study a number of signaling schemes and responses from agents.
Signaling Schemes
We introduce two signaling schemes. These schemes are designed to communicate information about the past cost of the M actions. Let H t denote the history of congestion costs up to time t:
Let H t denote the set of all possible histories at time t. For a fixed integer d, a signaling scheme is a set of mappings {s t : H t → R d | t = 1, 2, . . .}, where s t denotes the signal that the central agent broadcasts to all agents at time t.
In scalar signaling schemes, we have d = M , one scalar value for each action. In interval signaling schemes, d = 2M , and s t = (u m t , u m t : m = 1, . . . , M ), with u m t ≤ u m t . Notice that scalar signaling schemes are equivalent to interval signaling schemes with u m t = u m t . Notice that these signaling schemes summarise the history of observations H t .
In a signaling scheme that we call r-extremum, for any fixed positive integer r, the central agent broadcasts the same signal s t,r = (u m t,r , u m t,r : m = 1, . . . , M ) to all agents at time t, where
In a signaling scheme that we call r-subinterval, for any fixed positive integer r, the central agent broadcasts the same signal s t,r = (u m t,r , u m t,r : m = 1, . . . , M ) to all agents at time t, such that
for all m. Notice that extremum signaling is a special case of subinterval signaling.
Agent Population and Policies
In response to the history of signals received prior to time t, every agent i takes action a i t . For example, this action can be a function of only the signal at a single time step t − 1. We assume that every agent acts based only on the signals, without considering the response of other agents to its own action. This is a reasonable assumption for three reasons. First, it is hard for the agent to obtain more information than the signal sent by the central agent. Second, the agents know that the signals received are consistent with past observations. Finally, when there is a large number of agents, each has a very limited effect on the population as a whole.
Formally, let S t denote the history of signals broadcast up to time t:
Let S t denote the set of possible realizations of signal histories up to time t. A mapping of a signal history to an action, S t → {A 1 , . . . , A M }, is called a policy. We assume that the number of agents N is fixed over time. We let Ω denote the set of all possible types of agents. Each type ω ∈ Ω is associated with a policy, and every agent of type ω follows the policy π ω :
We model the evolution of the number of agents of each type as follows. Let {η k : Ω → R | k = 1, . . . , K} denote a finite set of probability measures over Ω. For instance, for each subset O ⊆ Ω, η k (O) can be interpreted as a fraction of agents with policy π ω , except that, for simplicity of analysis, the product η k (O)N does not have to be an integer. We let (d 1 , . . . , d K ) denote a probability measure over (η 1 , . . . , η K ), i.e., a probability measure over a set of probability measures over Ω. The distribution of agents among types Ω over time steps t = 1, 2, . . . is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables {µ t }, where the distribution of µ t is defined as P(µ t = η k ) d k for all k. This allows us to model a population of agents that changes over time, e.g., one driver leaves the road network and is replaced by another driver, with another policy. For simplicity, we call µ t the population profile at time t.
π ω -policies
In the case of r-extremum signaling, we consider a set of agent types Ω = [0, 1]. Recall that every agent i receives the interval signal s t := (u m t , u m t : m = 1, . . . , M ). In response, we assume that each agent i of type ω follows the policy π ω :
These policies seem natural, when one considers the following special cases:
• Risk-seeking ω = 1, i.e., acts based only on the best-case elements (u m t : m = 1, . . . , M )
• Risk-averse ω = 0, i.e., acts based only on the worst-case elements (u m t : m = 1, . . . , M )
• Risk-neutral ω = 0.5, i.e., acts based on the midpoints (u m t + u m t )/2 : m = 1, . . . , M .
Notice that this approach (4) could also model convexifying "multi-objective" agents, e.g., 90% risk-seeking and 10% risk-averse.
Interval Signaling
The following proposition motivates the introduction of interval signaling. Specifically, it shows that interval signaling schemes make it possible to all but get rid of a particularly bad cyclical outcome, sometimes known as "flapping" in networking literature. Proposition 1 (The Price of Flapping). For every number J > 0, M = 2, and an odd integer N ≥ 3, there exist functions c 1 , c 2 , a set Ω, a population profile µ, and an interval signaling scheme ρ such that for every scalar signaling scheme σ, we have
Proof. Let µ µ t be deterministic for all t. For interval signaling, observe that:
In contrast, recall that the scalar signaing scheme is equivalent to interval signaling scheme with u X t = u X t , X ∈ {A 1 , . . . , A M }, when the agents follow the policies π ω for any ω. For all ω, ω , we have π ω = π ω , ω thus becomes irrelevant, and hence we have:
For an arbitrary constant J, let us construct c 1 , c 2 , where the difference in the social cost of the resulting congestion profiles
The optimum of the social cost C is clearly achieved for congestion profiles such that {n 1 t , n 2 t } = 1 N { N/2 , N/2 }. For interval signaling, we can find ω and an initial signal s 1 ∈ R 4 such that (n 1 1 , n 2 1 ) ∈ O 2 by the argument above. Even with r-extremum interval signaling ρ with r = 2, we obtain (n 1 t , n 2 t ) ∈ O 2 . For any scalar signaling scheme σ, however, the congestion profile (n 1 t , n 2 t ) will alternate between elements of O 1 .
Hence, C σ t+1 = J + 1, C ρ t+1 = 1, and C σ t+1 − C ρ t+1 = J.
The example used in the proof of Proposition 1 may seem extreme, but extensive simulations, which we have conducted, do suggest that the cyclic behaviour encountered in scalar signaing is indeed reduced to a large extent, when one applies interval signaling.
r-Extremum Signaling
In this section, we consider r-extremum signaling. We show that it is stable in the sense that the population profile converges in distribution under mild assumptions. First, we study the case, where the parameter r is the function r(t) = t of the time step t. Assumption 1 (i.i.d. µ t , "Population Renewal"). The distribution µ t is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables with P(µ t = η k ) = d k for all t and k.
Notice that the population renewal assumption does not entail the elements of the random vector µ t being independent. We show that under the population renewal assumption, the congestion profile (n 1 t , n 2 t ) converges. First, we state a result from iterated function systems that we will use. Proposition 2 (Barnsley et al. Barnsley, Elton, and Hardin (1989) ). Let w in be i.i.d. such that P(w in = H k ) = d k for all k. Suppose that there exists r < 1 such that
then, the limit lim n w in . . . w i1 x exists and is independent of x. Theorem 3 ("Asymptotic Stability under Population Renewal"). There exists constant k , such that under Assumption 1, if the functions {c m : m = 1, . . . , M } are -Lipschitz continuous for < 1/(N k ), there exists a unique limit random variable Z such that the congestion profile n t /N converges to Z in distribution as t → ∞.
Given the page limits, this and other proofs missing subsequently appear only in the appendix as supplementary material.
Remark 1 (Functions satisfying Theorem 3). Observe that, for example, the function
Although the case of infinite recall is amenable to analysis, the case of finite recall is more realistic. We hence simulate the finite recall case. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the congestion profile over time for various values of recall r. Notice that the effects of the initial signal get propagated every r timesteps. The chosen initial signal produces the congestion profile (0.5, 0.5) in expectation, which is far removed from the social optimum. Hence, the higher the recall r, the lower the time-averaged social cost C T for T >> r, as suggested also by Figure 3 .
Optimal r-Subinterval Signaling
Let us now study the optimisation over signals, which lie within the extrema of the past r observations, but are not necessarily the extrema themselves. Notice that these observations are realisations of random variables, and hence the feasible region is a random set.
Full Information
First, we consider the full-information case, which relies on the following assumption. Assumption 2 (Full Information). Let us assume that Ω is a finite set and the number of agents of type ω at time t + 1 is n t+1 (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Let us assume n t+1 (ω) is known to the central agent at time t. Figure 1 are used with the initial signal s 1 = (0.5, 1, 0.6, 0.9), and with the population given by Ω = {0, 0.5, 1, Uniform(0, 1), Uniform(0, 1)}, κ = 0.15, µ t (ω) ∼ Uniform(1/5 − κ, 1/5 + κ) ∀ω ∈ Ω, t > 1, and N = 30. Figure 1 are used with the initial signal s 1 = (0.5, 1, 0.6, 0.9), and with the population given by Ω = {0, 0.5, 1, Uniform(0, 1), Uniform(0, 1)}, κ = 0.15, µ t (ω) ∼ Uniform(1/5 − κ, 1/5 + κ) ∀ω ∈ Ω, t > 1, and N = 30.
We first need to choose the objective to optimise. One could consider long-run objectives, such as the least fix-point, the large limit lim t→∞ C t (cf. Eq. 2), etc. Such long-run objectives are perhaps preferable, but lead to infinite-dimensional optimization problems, which are notoriously difficult. Specifically: Proposition 4 (Undecidability). Suppose that M = 2. There exist an interval signaling scheme {s t }, cost functions c 1 , c 2 , a deterministic sequence of population profiles {µ t }, and a limit point s ∈ R n such that the problem of whether the sequence of signals s t converge to s from s 1 is undecidable.
Proof. Observe that s t ∈ R n for some n 2 for every interval signaling scheme with M = 2. Let µ be fixed and suppose that µ t = µ for all t. In the point-to-fixed-point problem, the goal is to decide whether given a piecewise affine function g : R n → R n and initial point x 1 ∈ R n , the iterates x t+1 = g(x t ) converge to a fixed point. This problem is known to be undecidable for n = 2 and piece-wise affine g. The proof is given by Blondel et al. (2001) using earlier results Koiran, Cosnard, and Garzon (1994) .
We hence focus on the optimality with respect to the next-step social cost C(n t+1 ). Even then, when c m are arbitrary, e.g. non-smooth, non-convex, the problem may be undecidable. For convex c m , the next-step social cost C(n t+1 ) is still a non-convex non-linear function of the signals, but a structured one. Before we state the main result, let us see:
Proposition 5 (C is Difference of Convex). For any functions c m convex on [0, 1], there exist solvers for the minimisation of the unconstrained social cost C (cf. Eq. 1), with guaranteed convergence to a stationary point in finite time.
Proof. Let us multiply C(·) by N to study the 2M terms one by one. We want to show that the rest is a sum of a convex and concave terms, which is known as "difference of Assumption 3 (Partial Information). Assume that µ t+1 ∼ D * and D * is unknown. Notice that the distribution is fully determined by P(µ t+1 = η k ) = d k . Let us denote the first two moments of the distribution of µ t+1 as f, Q:
and let us assume f, Q are known to the central agent at time t.
Notice that the assumption is reasonable: the central agent is capable of estimating the distribution of agents µ using statistical estimation techniques. Similar assumptions have been used since 1980s Lo (1987) ; Dupačová (1987) and semidefinite programming has been used to solve problems with linear objectives under such assumptions since mid-1990s Boyle and Lin (1997) . Our contribution lies in studying distributional robustness of non-convex programs:
Theorem 7 (The Distributionally Robust Optimum). For functions c m convex on [0, 1], a stationary point of a distributionally robust r-subinterval interval signaling scheme
where the inner maximisation is over all distribution functions of Ω with the first two moments of Assumption 3, n m t is a function of such a distribution, and P ∈ R 2M are the r-subinterval signals, c.f. (3), is approximable up to any precision in finite time. Remark 4. For optimisation problems such as (5) and (7), there are solvers based on sequential convex programming with known rates of convergence Lanckriet and Sriperumbudur (2009); Yen et al. (2012) . In our computational experiements, we have extended a sequential convex programming solver of Stingl et al. Stingl, Kočvara, and Leugering (2009) , which handles polynomial semidefinite programming of (7), to handle mixed-integer polynomial semidefinite programming. Specifically, Stingl et al. approximate nonlinear objective functions by block separable convex models, following the approach of Ben-Tal and Zhibulevsky Ben-Tal and Zibulevsky (1997) and Kočvara and Stingl Kočvara and Stingl (2003) . For M = 2, the stationary point (5) for the cost functions of Figure 1 can be approximated to 10 −6 in about 15 seconds seconds on a basic i5-2520M laptop.
Given the lack of a test of the signaling schemes in a real-life city deployment, so far, we demonstrate the potential gains in a small-scale, preliminary, simulation on the running example. Figure 4 shows that the optimisation over signals reduces the social cost considerably. Cf. also the plot corresponding to r = 7 in Figure 2 .
Conclusion
Interval signaling schemes, as opposed to scalar signaling schemes, have tremendous potential in reducing the social cost of congestion problems because of two properties. full information first moments extremum Figure 4 : r-Extremum signaling (in blue) compared to the full information optimum (in red) and the optimization using the first moments only (in green), all under Assumption 1: The process {C(n t )} over time for r = 7 with error bars at one standard deviation. The cost functions of Figure 1 are used with the initial signal s 1 = (0.5, 1, 0.6, 0.9), and with the population given by Ω = {0, 0.5, 1, Uniform(0, 1), Uniform(0, 1)}, κ = 0.15, µ t (ω) ∼ Uniform(1/5 − κ, 1/5 + κ) ∀ω ∈ Ω, t > 1, and N = 30.
First, the r-Extremum variant is shown to induce a convergent behavior in a stochastic population of risk-averse users. Second, we have shown that the social cost can be optimized using a variety of methods, even under the constraints that the interval signals remain consistent with past values of cost functions c m and with empirical estimates of the first two moments of the population profile.
